



Croatian Review of Economic, Business and Social Statistics (CREBSS)  
UDK: 33;519,2; DOI: 10.1515/crebss; ISSN 1849-8531 (Print); ISSN 2459-5616 (Online) 
 
 




Informal payments by patients in Croatia: 
benign custom or detrimental residue from 
socialism? 
 
Josip Franić  








Almost three decades after the collapse of the socialist system, numerous informal 
practices inherited from that period have remained deeply entrenched in the 
Croatian economy and society. Faced with burdensome regulations and 
complicated procedures, many citizens and companies opt to resolve their problems 
using string-pulling, bribery and undeclared work. However, there are many other 
informal means of conduct, which have not been given adequate attention so far. 
One of them is the practice of giving gratuity and gifts to medical practitioners for 
services that are already covered by health insurance, whose roots and the exact 
function are still not sufficiently understood. To start filling the gap, this paper explores 
which groups of citizens give out-of-pocket payments to doctors and nurses, as well 
as what motivates them to do so. The logistic regression analysis applied on data from 
the Special Eurobarometer Survey No 470, which was conducted in October 2017 on 
a stratified sample of 1,038 Croatians, reveals that these payments by no means 
represent a benevolent custom of expressing gratitude for healing. Even though a 
certain portion of citizens exercises this practice out of choice, informal payments 
more commonly occur following a direct request by medical staff or simply because 
the patient feels a pressure to do so. As revealed by the analysis, the majority of such 
transactions in Croatia highly resemble standard forms of bribery. In line with this, it is 
recipients rather than donors of gifts and cash supplements who should be targeted 
in endeavours to eradicate the phenomenon. 
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Introduction 
During the last decade of the twentieth century Croatia has witnessed flourishing of 
various informal practices inherited from the turbulent socialist period (Čučković, 2002, 
Ott, 2002, Bejaković, 2009). Contrary to the prevalent belief that these misconducts 
would lose their momentum once the country finished economic and cultural 
transition, most forms of illegitimate behaviour have remained deeply embedded in 
business and social interactions of Croatian citizens (Goel, Budak, Rajh, 2012, 
Bejaković, Williams, 2017, Franic, Williams, 2017, Franic, 2019). Vast and inefficient 
public administration, the weak rule of law and prevalent distrust in the state institutions 
seem to have paved the way for clandestine transactions to became a standard 
mode of operating in this South-East European country (Bejaković, 2009, Baric, 
Williams, 2013, Franic, Williams, 2017).  
Informal supplementary payments by patients to doctors and nurses are certainly 
not an exception in this regard (Budak, Rajh, 2014, European Commission, 2017a, 
2017b). Also known as under-the-table payments, out-of-pocket payments, envelope 
payments and under-the-counter payments (Cherecheş, Ungureanu, Rus, Baba, 
2011), this particular practice connotes all forms of “a direct contribution, which is 
made in addition to any contribution determined by the terms of entitlement, in cash 
or in kind, by patients or others acting on their behalf, to health care providers for 
services that the patients are entitled to” (Gaal, Belli, McKee, Szócska, 2006, p. 276). 
Although being somewhat less pervasive compared to other post-socialist countries, 
gifts and cash supplements given prior or after receiving treatment in public 
healthcare institutions severely undermine efficiency and fairness of the Croatian 
healthcare system (European Commission, 2017a, 2017b).  
However, it is hard to expect any success in the fight against this practice without 
detailed insight into the mechanisms underlying its existence. No study has evaluated 
this matter so far, and therefore here we seek to address precisely this gap. 
Specifically, the idea is to explore why some Croatians spend additional financial 
resources for services that are already paid and in which circumstances these 
transactions usually happen. In line with this, the article is expected to have both 
theoretical and practical contribution. Alongside advancing our knowledge about 
the causes and nature of informal patient payments in Croatia, the findings presented 
here will also signalise to the authorities which policy responses could yield best results. 
To achieve the above-mentioned objectives, the next section summarises the most 
important findings on this phenomenon from other countries around the world. This is 
followed by a short overview of the literature on Croatia and discussion about the 
research hypotheses which are tested in this paper. Section 4 then explains the 
methodology applied to do so, while Section 5 provides the results of the undertaken 
analysis. The last part of the paper brings concluding remarks. 
 
Why do people pay for medical services which are 
supposed to be free? 
Unlike other contacts with public servants, those in healthcare institutions are 
frequently life-important matters. Since the quality and speed of services received in 
hospitals can significantly affect one’s well-being, many societies have developed a 
benevolent custom of expressing thankfulness to doctors and nurses in the form of gifts 
and/or tips (Gaal, McKee, 2005, Gaal et al., 2006, Cockcroft et al., 2008, Cohen, 2012). 
In point of fact, this tradition has been evidenced in all but few countries around the 
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European Commission, 2014, Williams, Horodnic, 2017).  
Nonetheless, in some societies it gradually evolved into a harmful economic 
practice, which slows down the provision of healthcare services and reduces trust in 
the system. This particularly applies to post-socialist countries of Europe and Asia, in 
which this transformation was already visible during the 1970s and 1980s (Lewis, 2000, 
Thompson, Witter, 2000, Gaal, McKee, 2005, Pavlova et al., 2010). Substantial 
economic difficulties which the Eastern Bloc faced at that time were above all 
reflected through shortages of goods, lower quality of services and frequent 
interruptions in supply. This forced citizens to seek alternative strategies for satisfying 
everyday needs, including but not limited solely to healthcare (Lewis, 2000, Thompson, 
Witter, 2000, Radin, 2009).  
Alongside the scarcity of medical equipment and drugs, an additional problem 
during that period were inadequate salaries of healthcare practitioners. In such 
circumstances, out-of-pocket payments by patients eventually became a tacitly 
approved norm, namely they served as informal wage supplements for underpaid 
medical personnel (Lewis, 2000, Ensor, 2004, Cohen, 2012, Stan, 2012, Radin, 2016).  
Yet, in numerous countries the scope of the problem grew out of control after the 
fall of socialist regimes. Besides additional reductions in the quality and availability of 
public services, the initial phase of transition was also characterised by severe 
expansion of various dishonest practices across all spheres of the economy. Many 
medical professionals hence seized the opportunity to abuse their monopolistic 
market position for private gain, which resulted in informal patient payments 
becoming more similar to standard forms of public sector corruption (Ensor, 2004, 
Radin, 2009, Pavlova et al., 2010). In the majority of post-socialist countries out-of-
pocket payments had, therefore, become a must: great many gift/money givers were 
actually reluctant participants, led primarily by the fear of being denied/postponed 
treatment or receiving poorer service rather than by desire to express gratitude (Vian, 
Grybosk, Sinoimeri, Hall, 2006, Moldovan, Van de Walle, 2013).  
The pervasiveness of the phenomenon was indeed evidenced by numerous surveys 
from that period. For instance, during the early 2000s one-third of medical treatments 
in Romania entailed additional payment for services that were already covered by 
public health insurance (Lewis, 2007), while in Bulgaria and Albania this was the case 
in every fifth interaction (Lewis, 2007). The situation was even more worrying in post-
soviet countries, where the recorded incidence of this practice during the late 1990s 
ranged from 31% in Latvia (Lewis, 2000), to 74% in the Russian Federation (Lewis, 2000) 
and 90% in Moldova (Lewis, 2007).  
Recent studies on the matter indicate that informal patient payments have 
remained a constituent part of healthcare systems in most transition economies 
(Stepurko, Pavlova, Gryga, Groot, 2010, Williams, Horodnic, Horodnic, 2016, European 
Commission, 2017a, Williams, Horodnic, 2018). The resultant schemes are, however, 
highly divergent in terms of actors involved and their rationales for participation. That 
is to say, scholars interested in this phenomenon generally agree that nowadays every 
single act of giving a gift and/or money in these societies actually lies on a continuum 
between two extremes: mere expression of gratitude which is initiated strictly by a 
patient and extortion on the part of service providers (Radin, 2009, Farcasanu, 2010, 
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Informal patient payments in Croatia – an overview of 
available studies 
Croatia was not exempt from the developments described above. According to the 
first study on this issue, which was conducted in 1994 on a random sample of 443 adults 
from Zagreb and Split, 14.0% of citizens engaged in the custom of buying a gift to 
healthcare personnel while 8.4% were giving cash supplements (Mastilica, Božikov, 
1999). A similar study from 2002, which included individuals from the whole country, 
revealed that some 12% of those Croatians who had visited a doctor during the 12-
month period preceding the survey spent additional financial resources for services 
they were entitled to (see Lewis, 2007). This share was comparable with those in 
transition economies of Central Europe, although somewhat lower than in other 
countries from the Balkans (Lewis, 2007).  
Only slight improvement in this respect was documented by the joint study of the 
Institute of Economics Zagreb and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime from 2010 
(see Budak, Rajh, 2014). This survey of 3,000 adults displayed that 8.3% of citizens who 
had contacts with medical practitioners over the preceding year gave in-cash or in-
kind contributions to doctors, while 6% of them had such experiences with nurses 
(Budak, Rajh, 2014). While supporting staff was commonly rewarded with food, 
beverages and other commodities of symbolic prices, doctors were given cash more 
often. More precisely, only one in eight informal payments to nurses involved cash, 
whereby every third payment to a doctor was strictly in cash (Budak, Rajh, 2014). 
This matter was further evaluated by the Special Eurobarometer survey on 
corruption, which took place in all 28 EU member states. According to the first wave 
of the survey from winter 2013, 2.57% of Croatians who had visited a public healthcare 
institution during the 12-month period before the interview were asked to give a 
gift/cash or did so out of choice (European Commission, 2014, Williams, Horodnic, 
2017). However, this should be perceived as a lower boundary for the real incidence 
rate, not only owing to a non-negligible refusal rate. Explicitly, the survey was 
concerned solely with cash-in-hand payments and ‘valuable’ gifts, thus omitting petty 
non-monetary bestowals in the form of chocolates, coffee, bottles of inexpensive 
wine, etc. What is more, respondents were left to freely decide what is ‘valuable’ and 
what is not, given that no clear cut-off point was provided. 
The same study was repeated in 2017, with some minor differences in the outcomes. 
Specifically, 3.6% of respondents admitted informal payments to medical practitioners 
in the form of cash or valuable gifts, while 1.7% of them refused to answer this question 
(European Commission, 2017a). It is hence more indicative to say that only 94.7% of 
study participants strictly denied any supplementary payments (European 
Commission, 2017a). 
Exactly this latest survey will be a starting point for our analysis. As already 
mentioned, no study on the causes and nature of out-of-pocket payments has been 
conducted so far, which is the gap this paper seeks to fill. In addition to examining 
socio-economic and demographic aspects of the phenomenon, the main aim is, 
therefore, to understand what motives some citizens to pay for services that are meant 
to be free of direct charge. This brings us to the ultimate goal of this study, which is to 
evaluate whether informal payments by patients in Croatia could be scrutinised 
through the prism of good manners or whether they are nothing more than a harmful 
leftover from previous periods. This will be done by analysing where these activities 
stand in the continuum between the expression of gratitude and extortion. In other 
words, the following two hypotheses will be tested in the rest of this paper: 
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custom of expressing thankfulness for received care 
 Extortion hypothesis: Informal patient payments in Croatia mostly occur 
following a direct request by the service providers or due to the patient feeling 
pressure to do so 
The next section provides a detailed description of the variables used and statistical 
methods applied to check which of these two hypotheses holds true in Croatia. 
 
Data and methods 
Conducted in October 2017, the Special Eurobarometer Survey No 470 enables a 
comprehensive insight into attitudes and experience of Europeans with bribery and 
related misconducts in public institutions. A stratified random sample of approximately 
1,000 individuals above 15 years of age was selected in every EU member state using 
a multi-stage random procedure. In the first step, a range of sampling points were 
drawn from every regional administrative unit, which were stratified by type of area 
and individual unit. Initial household addresses in each of the sampling points were 
then randomly determined, while subsequent households were chosen using the 
standard random route procedure. Interviewees from the sampled households were 
selected following the closest birthday rule. 
The survey covered different areas of public administration, but particular attention 
was paid to the healthcare system. Participants were first inquired if they had any visit 
to a public healthcare institution in the last twelve months. Those who answered 
positively were then asked the following question: “Apart from official fees did you 
have to give an extra payment or a valuable gift to a nurse or a doctor, or make a 
donation to the hospital?” 
To evaluate what distinguishes individuals who gave a confirmative answer to this 
question from the rest of the sample, we apply logistic regression modelling (Cramer, 
2003, Menard, 2002, Hosmer, Lemeshow, Sturdivant, 2013). If P(Yi=1) denotes the 
probability of giving a contribution in cash or in kind for individual i, then the 











β + β X
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,     (1) 
 
where Xk (k=1,…,K) represents an explanatory variable exerting effect βk on the 
modelled probability, and K stands for the total number of such variables. 
The key variable used to evaluate the gratitude hypothesis is the one measuring 
attitude towards non-monetary bestowals of public officers. Explicitly, every survey 
participant was asked to what extent they find acceptable when someone gives a 
gift to a public servant in any sphere of public administration, whereby the following 
three options were offered: never acceptable, sometimes acceptable, and always 
acceptable. Small in-kind contributions are generally recognised as a benevolent 
occurrence in most cultures (Lewis, 2000, Vian et al., 2006, Moldovan, Pavlova et al., 
2010, Stan, 2012, Van de Walle, 2013), and therefore a positive effect of this variable 
would imply that thankfulness indeed plays a vital role in the decision-making process 
of Croatian patients.  
Besides this, the interviewees were also requested to express their opinion about 
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in the case of non-monetary contributions. Since under-the-table cash compensations 
are usually associated with bribery (Gaal, McKee, 2005, Stepurko, Pavlova, Gryga, 
Groot, 2013), this variable is also included in the model so as to see where informal 
patient payments stand in comparison with the standard forms of corruption. 
Another feature essential for the evaluation of the first hypothesis is the financial 
situation of a patient. If informal payments are an expression of free will on the part of 
the giver, then it is expected that more affluent individuals will be more likely to reward 
service providers. As the survey did not contain any direct question about the personal 
wealth of a respondent, we use a proxy variable indicating whether they had 
difficulties paying bills during the analysed period. The following three options were 
offered: most of the time, from time to time, and almost never/never.  
It is also important to inspect if the type of settlement in which an individual lives 
exerts any influence on their behaviour. As shown by studies from other countries, this 
practice is usually more widespread in smaller communities due to much stronger 
social ties among their inhabitants (see Williams et al., 2016, Williams, Horodnic, 2018). 
Informal payments in rural areas are hence more frequently a benign tool for 
strengthening those ties rather than an imposed behaviour. In line with this, if the 
logistic regression reveals that people from rural parts of Croatia have a higher 
inclination towards informal payments, this will suggest that gratitude hypothesis may 
indeed be valid. 
Similar arguments also hold true in the case of gender, given that studies from 
around the world identified women as more common participants in this practice 
(Stepurko et al., 2015, Williams et al., 2016, Williams, Horodnic, 2018). This is explained 
by women not only placing more emphasis on social relations but also being more 
disposed to express their feelings (and gratefulness in particular). Significant effect of 
gender would, therefore, also support the gratitude hypothesis.  
Turning to the extortion hypothesis, we use two covariates to evaluate its validity in 
Croatia. The first and more important of them is a perception regarding the 
pervasiveness of bribery and abuse of power among healthcare practitioners. This is a 
binary variable designating whether or not a respondent believes that these two 
represent a significant obstacle in the functioning of the system. The second variable 
is a binary indicator for any direct experience with corruption in other public spheres 
(i.e. outside the healthcare system) during the last twelve months. A positive effect of 
these two covariates would signalise that the decision to give a gift and/or money to 
medical practitioners is more likely to be an outcome of one’s expectations and/or 
previous negative experience rather than an expression of free will. 
Finally, we also include respondents’ age in the model, primarily as a control 
variable. A positive effect is expected in this case, not only owing to pre-capitalist 
origins of informal patient payments (as explained before) but also because older 
individuals are more likely to face serious health issues that require repeated 
treatments.  
An exhaustive account of the explanatory variables used in logistic modelling and 
the exact coding of theirs is provided in Table 1. Before moving to the presentation of 
results, it ought to be stressed that this is by no means a complete list of factors that 
could help in explaining why some patients in Croatia reside on informal payments to 
medical practitioners, while others do not have such a habit. Indeed, there are many 
other socio-economic features that are known to affect the behaviour of people in 
this respect, with the level of education and marital status being the most important 
among them (see Arsenijevic, Pavlova, Groot, 2015, Williams, Horodnic, 2017, 2018). 
However, the inclusion of additional variables would only increase the number of model 
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particularly helpful in testing our hypotheses. For that reason, the decision was made to 
include only the eight variables mentioned above in the final statistical model, although 
a wider depiction of the practice will be provided in a descriptive manner. 
 
Table 1 An overview of the explanatory variables 




A binary variable representing 
the gender of a respondent 
0 - male; 
1 - female 
0 
Age 
An interval variable denoting the 
exact age of an interviewed 
individual 
Values designate the 
exact age 
0 
Type of community 
A categorical variable for the 
type of the residence area in 
which an interviewee lives 
1 - rural area/village; 
2 - small/middle-sized 
town; 
3 - large town 
0 
Financial difficulties 
A categorical variable 
designating the frequency of 
facing difficulties in paying bills 
1 - most of the time; 
2 - from time to time; 
3 - almost never/never 
5 
Tolerance towards 
giving gifts to public 
officials 
A categorical variable specifying 
to what extent the respondent 
finds it acceptable when 
someone gives a gift to public 
officials 
1 - never acceptable; 
2 - sometimes 
acceptable; 
3 - always acceptable 
3 
Tolerance towards 
giving money to 
public officials 
A categorical variable specifying 
to what extent the respondent 
finds it acceptable when 
someone gives money to public 
officials 
1 - never acceptable; 
2 - sometimes 
acceptable; 
3 - always acceptable 
6 
Experience with 
bribery in other 
public spheres 
A binary variable displaying 
whether the respondent was 
asked or expected by public 
servants outside the healthcare 
system to give a gift/extra money 
0 - no; 
1 - yes 
0 
Perception of the 
pervasiveness of 
bribery in the 
healthcare system 
A binary indicator designating 
whether the respondents see 
bribery and abuse of power as 
widespread among healthcare 
practitioners in Croatia 
0 - no; 
1 - yes 
0 
Source: Authors’ own representation. 
 
An additional justification for limiting the number of explanatory variables can be 
found in a non-negligible number of missing values in the modelled variable. While this 
problem was anticipated owing to the sensitivity of the researched matter, it had to 
be adequately addressed in order to obtain credible results. Given that the same issue 
was also encountered for some of the explanatory variables (see Table 1), multiple 
imputation procedure was employed so as to replace non-existent answers (see 
Rubin, 1987, van Buuren, 2007, Newman, 2014). Explicitly, fifty imputations were 
simulated for every missing value using the system of chained equations. 
 
Results 
An insight into socio-economic, demographic and spatial characteristics of the 
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starting point in our search for the mechanisms underlying this phenomenon in Croatia. 
As can be seen, out-of-pocket payments were most frequently admitted by people 
from Dalmatia (8.8%), followed by residents of Lika and Banovina (7%). However, one 
should be careful when making conclusions about the geographical dispersion of this 
practice due to rather high refusal rates in certain regions. This above all applies to the 
capital and its surroundings, given that the share of individuals failing to provide an 
exact answer in this part of the country was actually considerably above the share of 
those who answered positively. As a matter of fact, Zagreb witnessed the lowest denial 
rate (Table 2). 
 
Table 2 Socio-economic, demographic and spatial characteristics of informal payers 
in Croatia, % of population 




Female 3.6 95.6 0.8 
Male 3.4 93.5 3.1 
Age 
15 - 24 0.0 100.0 0.0 
25 - 39 2.3 94.2 3.5 
40 - 54 3.0 94.7 2.3 
55+ 5.3 93.7 1.0 
Marital 
status 
(Re-)Married 5.2 93.4 1.4 
Cohabiting 1.4 94.3 4.3 
Single 1.1 98.1 0.8 
Divorced 0.0 91.3 8.7 




No formal education/Still studying 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Elementary/High school 3.5 94.9 1.6 
University degree and higher 4.4 92.1 3.5 
Occup. 
Employed/Self-employed 2.3 95.3 2.4 
Unemployed 4.2 91.3 4.5 
Inactive (house persons, students, 
etc.) 
1.4 98.6 0.0 
Retired 5.5 93.7 0.8 
Region 
Zagreb and surrounding 3.6 90.5 5.9 
North Croatia 4.5 94.7 0.8 
Slavonia 0.5 99.5 0.0 
Lika and Banovina 7.0 93.0 0.0 
Istra, Rijeka and Gorski Kotar 2.7 97.3 0.0 
Dalmatia 8.8 91.2 0.0 
Total 3.6 94.7 1.7 
Source: Authors’ own work based on the Special Eurobarometer 470/Wave EB88.2. 
 
Turning to the demographic features of the payers, there seems not to exist a 
substantial difference between genders in this respect. Although women were more 
likely to admit such behaviour (3.6% compared to 3.4% for men), this does not 
necessarily imply they indeed participate more frequently. Owing to the unequal 
dispersion of missing values between these two groups, we prolong the discussion 
about the exact role of gender to the part of the text which presents results of statistical 
modelling.  
Results are, however, more apparent when it comes to the role of age. Not only are 
the oldest citizens most inclined to give valuable gifts and money to medical 
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this question in the first place (i.e. refusal rate was only 1%). The opposite is true for 
individuals below 40 years of age, given that only 2.3% of them answered positively, 
while 3.5% did not give an exact answer (Table 2). Interestingly, all individuals aged 24 
and less denied giving gifts/money to medical staff, which is in line with the previously 
stated assumption. This particular issue will also be discussed later in more detail, after 
presenting the results of logistic regression. 
In any case, the importance of age can be further grasped from the occupational 
structure of informal payers. As can be seen from Table 2, retired individuals are most 
frequent actors in such transactions. Interestingly, the unemployed seem to be more 
likely to offer cash supplements and gifts than individuals having a job. In fact, the real 
participation rate for this particular group of citizens is probably much higher, given a 
rather high refusal rate.  
Table 2 also reveals that married individuals are by far most inclined towards this 
practice. One in twenty respondents from this group admitted giving gifts and/or 
money during one of their latest encounters with medical practitioners, which is in line 
with the research findings from other transition economies (Williams et al., 2016, 
Williams, Horodnic, 2018). The same is also true for education, given that informal 
payments appear to be most common among highly educated individuals in Croatia. 
 
 
Figure 1 Reasons for giving informal supplements, % of survey 
respondents admitting this practice 
Source: Authors’ own work based on the Special Eurobarometer 470/Wave EB88.2. 
 
The next important thing to analyse is who usually initiates out-of-pocket payments 
and at what point they are done. Every individual admitting their involvement in this 
practice was offered six scenarios and asked to state which of them apply to their 
latest experiences. The results summarised in Figure 1 disclose that almost every tenth 
individual was requested material contribution by a doctor or nurse prior the 
treatment, while one in five was actually forced to spend additional money by being 
redirected to a private institution. These findings undoubtedly show that many medical 
professionals abuse their position for private gain, which indicates that the extortion 
hypothesis probably holds true in Croatia. 
Nevertheless, informal payments are more often done on the initiative of a patient. 
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personal decision of the service receiver, whereby the act happened after the 
treatment. Although slightly less frequent, prior-the-treatment exchanges are also 
quite common in Croatian healthcare. Explicitly, 16% of the citizens had at least one 
recent visit to healthcare professionals where they decided to play their cards in the 
very beginning. 
 
Table 3 Determinants of informal payments by patients in Croatia, logistic regression 
results 
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
Female 0.346 0.506 
Age 0.028* 0.012 
Type of community (RC: Rural area)   
Small/middle-sized town 0.710 0.627 
Large town 0.452 0.658 
Financial difficulties (RC: Most of the time)   
 From time to time 0.618 0.720 
Almost never/never -1.035 0.768 
Tolerance towards giving gifts to public 
officials (RC: Never acceptable) 
  
Sometimes acceptable  0.482 0.509 
Always acceptable -0.820 1.028 
Tolerance towards giving money to public 
officials (RC: Never acceptable) 
  
Sometimes acceptable  -1.280 1.314 
Always acceptable 1.205 1.391 
Experience with bribery in other public 
spheres 
1.715*** 0.531 
Perception of the pervasiveness of 
bribery in the healthcare system 
1.087* 0.510 
Cons -6.844*** 1.505 
Size of the sample 672 
Number of imputed values 50 
Prob > F 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.180 
Area under ROC 0.820 
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Source: Authors’ own work based on the Special Eurobarometer 470/Wave EB88.2. 
 
Yet, logistic regression on the determinants of patient behaviour reveals that this 
voluntarism is more often a result of external pressure rather than a mere desire to 
express gratitude. As can be seen from Table 3, individuals who think that corruption is 
a severe problem in public healthcare institutions are statistically more likely to rely on 
informal payments than those who do not share this opinion. This would suggest that 
many of Croatians who give gifts or gratuity on their own most probably do it out of a 
belief that the service providers expect additional compensation.  
This notion is further reinforced by the findings on the association between direct 
experience with corruption in other public institutions and one’s propensity to reward 
medical staff. Explicitly, citizens who were recently asked by a public servant outside 
the healthcare to give a gift or extra money are statistically more likely to find 
themselves in the same situation when interacting with medical practitioners. These 
results, therefore, challenge the idea of out-of-pocket payments to doctors and nurses 
being a free choice on the part of a giver.  
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importantly, no significant link was found between one’s tolerance towards giving gifts 
and their propensity to do so prior or after the contact with doctors and nurses (Table 
3). In fact, individuals justifying such behaviour in any circumstance appear to be less 
likely to utilise out-of-pocket payments compared to those who are entirely against 
gift rewards. However, the resulting coefficient is not significant, and the same holds 
true for the coefficient measuring whether the attitude towards cash payments exert 
any influence in this respect. These findings, therefore, show that supplementary 
payments in Croatia cannot generally be seen as a benign custom of expressing 
thankfulness for healing. 
A further argument against the gratitude hypothesis can be found in the complete 
absence of any link between the financial situation of a patient and their likelihood to 
employ informal payments. As a matter of fact, citizens who never face financial 
difficulties seem to have a lower predisposition for giving gratuity and gifts than those 
who are struggling to have their ends meet, although the accompanying coefficient 
is not significant (Table 3). As well, we found no statistical evidence for this practice 
being more likely to occur in smaller communities nor among women. These findings 
hence refute the idea of informal patient payments in Croatia serving the role of social 
glue.  
Finally, logistic regression highlighted the age of a patient as one of the central 
factors driving their behaviour. The older an individual is, the higher their propensity to 
give gratuity or gift is. Younger individuals, on the other hand, do not mind rewarding 
medical practitioners for the services which they had already paid through 
compulsory health insurance.  
 
Discussion and conclusion 
Akin to their counterparts from other post-socialist countries, many patients in Croatia 
engage in additional out-of-pocket payments to medical staff for the services they 
are entitled to by legislation. To understand why this is happening, this paper sought 
to identify key factors underlying the decision-making process of citizens in this regard. 
As revealed by a broader insight into the socio-economic and demographic 
peculiarities of the actors involved, informal payments are more common among 
highly educated individuals, and particularly among married ones. On the other hand, 
no significant discrepancies between genders nor between inhabitants from different 
types of settlements (i.e. rural areas; small and mid-size towns; and large cities) were 
found. 
In fact, it is actually age what mostly distinguishes informal payers from the rest of 
the population. The practice persists mainly among older population cohorts, while 
younger citizens seldom show this form of misbehaviour. An optimistic explanation for 
this would be that younger generations either have been abandoning this detrimental 
practice or have never accepted it in the first place. If true, this would suggest that 
out-of-pocket payments by Croatian patients are only a leftover from the socialist 
period, which will lose its momentum in the future. Nonetheless, it is more plausible that 
gifts and envelopes are reserved for treatments of severe health conditions, which are 
more frequently encountered in the case of older citizens. Faced with a life-
threatening condition on the one hand, and numerous obstacles in their struggle to 
overcome it on the other (long waiting lists, unmotivated medical professionals, low 
quality of services received, etc.), many citizens are presumably ready to do whatever 
is needed so as to speed up the process. However, although it sounds quite 
reasonable, the validity of this latter theory cannot be tested with available data. More 
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Whatever the case might be, many service providers in Croatia undoubtedly abuse 
their position for personal gain. As exposed by our analysis, lots of patients open their 
pursers either following a direct request by medical staff or due to feeling that the 
other side expects under-the-table contribution. Many cases of informal patient 
payments to doctors and nurses in Croatia hence highly resemble standard forms of 
public sector bribery.  
In line with this, it is receivers, not the givers of informal payments who should be 
targeted in the efforts to eradicate the phenomenon. Besides putting additional 
emphasis on this issue during their education, the authorities should also seek effective 
mechanisms for identifying and punishing medical staff who request any unofficial 
contribution from patients or accept donations above the prescribed value. Yet, more 
tangible salary increases could also help, since this would undoubtedly reduce the 
motivation of doctors and nurses to seek additional sources of income. 
Several notes of caution are, however, necessary at this point. First of all, even 
though the two waves of the Special Eurobarometer survey indicated a moderate 
decline in the occurrence of informal patient payments compared to previous 
periods, this does not necessarily mean that nowadays fewer patients bring plastic or 
paper bags to the public healthcare institutions. Many survey respondents most likely 
did not bother to report a bottle of wine or a box of chocolates, as they were strictly 
asked about ‘valuable gifts’ (however interpreted). As a result, the real incident rate 
of this phenomenon in Croatia is certainly much larger than suggested by the survey. 
Yet, even if this particular form of misbehaviour was indeed gradually vanishing from 
society, this would not automatically imply an overall drop of illegitimate practices and 
abuse of power in Croatian healthcare. In fact, service providers and patients 
represent only the final loops in the perplex chain of stakeholders within this complex 
system. There are many other actors securing the smooth operation of public 
healthcare, with the most important among them being drug suppliers, producers of 
medical equipment, private insurance agencies and public healthcare fund. Mutual 
interactions of these stakeholders hence make the public healthcare system a fruitful 
field for various forms of illicit behaviour.  
Actually, it would even be inappropriate to conclude that patients themselves are 
generally becoming less prone to circumventing rules and procedures. There are 
many other types of fraudulent activities which go beyond contribution in kind or in 
cash to the medical staff with whom they directly interact. Most notable such 
misconducts include discretionary envelope payments to other gate-keepers and 
pulling strings to achieve advantages over remaining patients. Unfortunately, not 
much is known about the pervasiveness and nature of these alternative strategies 
used by citizens to outsmart the system. If this paper thus motivates other researchers 
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